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Abstract 
In the International Strategic Management (ISM) field of research, a frequently studied problem is the impact of distance (both 
geographical  and cultural) on organizational effectiveness and reliability. In high reliability organizations (HROs), the operator is 
one who addresses operational issues, often acting far (hierarchically and physically) from the managerial level, alone or as part of 
a team. This article discusses issues related to 1) the coordination mechanisms used by a multinational organization to ensure 
reliability; 2) the characteristics possessed by the operator and 3) the training strategies that should be used to develop their skills; 
lastly 4) a discussion of the relationship between the group agent (team) and organizational reliability. 
.  
1. Introduction 
International strategic management1 (ISM) research saw rapid growth through the 1980s (Ricks et al., 1990) and the 
1990s (Werner, 2002; for a review, Lu, 2003). In her review, Lu (2003) highlights that an important category of 
research in this field of study is leadership and organization, in particular internal coordination and decision-making. 
Studies in this group tend to look at challenges involved in managing foreign subsidiaries. Such challenges include 
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issues of the control (Nobel and Birkinshaw, 1998) and coordination (e.g., Martinez and Jarillo, 1991) of international 
subsidiaries. Research has also examined knowledge flows in the organization (e.g., Ghoshal et al., 1994; Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 1991) and a firm’s need for internal coordination (Roth, 1995). Research on decision-making has 
focused on the effectiveness of planning (Jones et al., 1992), sometimes as contingent on the profiles and effectiveness 
of boards of directors (Kriger, 1991). The first aim of this article is to discuss issues related to the coordination 
mechanisms used by a multinational organization to ensure effectiveness.  
From the theoretical perspective (Lu, 2003), the transaction cost theory and the internalization theory have been the 
mainstream theoretical perspectives employed in ISM studies. Three other theoretical perspectives emerged in the 
1990s: institutional theory, organizational learning/knowledge management (OL/KM) theory, and the resource-based 
view of the firm (RBV). The theoretical perspective adopted in the field of ISM has been shifting from economic 
theories to multidisciplinary approaches: the second purpose of this paper is to give a contribution to theoretical 
perspective by starting from the point of view of Agency Theory and Organizational Behaviour. 
Organizations, and in particular subsidiaries of a multinational company, frequently perform in a situation 
characterized by bounded rationality (Simon, 1957), uncertainty (outputs/outcomes depending not only on the actions 
of operators: Jensen Meckling, 1976), and distribution of information with information asymmetry in favor of the 
operators, since they are often closer to the “front line” of operations, and far from their headquarters. That 
characteristics are typical of an Agency Relationship or Theory (AT), largely studied in literature (for a review, 
Eisenhardt, 1989). The AT describes the exchange relationship between an actor (the Principal, in this case the 
headquarters) who delegates to another actor (the Agent, in this case the subsidiary) the discretionary power (i.e., 
decision-making responsibilities) to act on behalf of the Principal for a reward (Jensen, Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). 
This exchange relationship makes it possible to align the Agent’s goals with the Principal’s for the sake of achieving 
desired efficacy. AT is concerned with resolving a problem that can occur in the agency relationship: the goals of the 
principal and of the agent may come into conflict, and it is difficult for the principal to control what the agent is 
actually doing. Asymmetrical sharing of information, in fact, can lead to opportunistic behaviour on the part of the 
agent, and this in turn can lead to unfavorable behaviour for the organization in terms of reliability. In line with an 
increasing body of literature, we conceptualize the MNC as consisting of semi-autonomous entities (Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1989; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991; Ambos, Ambos, 2009), in which units in dispersed locations take on 
various missions and control heterogeneous stocks of knowledge (Foss and Pedersen, 2002). In accord with Ambos 
and Ambos (2009), we define knowledge as “accumulated practical skill or expertise that allows one to do something 
smoothly and efficiently” (Kogut and Zander, 1992, p. 386), and the distribution of information and knowledge is in 
favor of each company unit (the Agent in the agency relationship). AT allows more  effective identification of 
coordination and control mechanisms, with the aim of reducing the agent’s opportunistic behaviour. In particular, 
Jensen e Meckling (1976) started from the hypothesis that when the principal-agent relationship is output-based, the 
agent behaves more frequently in line with the principal’s goals. From a strategic point of view, in a multinational 
company  it is necessary to translate the subsidiary’s mission into individual objectives at the operator’s level , in 
accord with a bottom-down process.  
The whole effectiveness of a multinational organization depends also on the reliability of each subsidiary. Under 
what conditions can subsidiaries (and their operators) successfully cope with unexpected events? Lastly, this article 
focuses on optimal coordination mechanisms to ensure reliability, and the third contribution of this paper highlights 
the skills that an operator must have in order to function successfully, and suggests appropriate actions for achieving 
these skills. In this sense, we have followed important suggestions from studies on High Reliability Organizations 
(HROs; Weick, Sutcliffe, 2007) and sensemaking capabilities (Weick, 1993; Lanzara, 1993), here supplemented by 
indications from the organizational theory of coordination and control (March, 1993; Olson et al., 2005). 
  
2. Coordination and control mechanisms for ensuring effectiveness and reliability 
As noted by Ambos and Ambos (2009, 1), knowledge flows across dispersed organizational units are vital for a 
company’s success (Bartlett and Ghoshal,1989; Hedlund,1994; Kogut and Zander, 1992). In the literature progress has 
been made with respect to the organizational mechanisms or capabilities used by multinational companies to transfer 
knowledge (Foss and Pedersen, 2002; Martin and Salomon, 2003a; Hansen and Lovas, 2004; Almeida et al., 2002). In 
an attempt to answer the question how different knowledge transfer mechanisms enhance the effectiveness of 
knowledge transfer, Ambos and Ambos (2009)  take a closer look at two distinct mechanisms: personal coordination 
mechanisms (PCM) and technology-based coordination mechanisms (TCM). This paper is focused on the first ones, 
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exploiting the contribution of organizational literature; mechanisms of coordination and control that rely on personal 
interactions between individuals are likely to be harmed by distance (Ambos, Ambos, 2009, 4). Despite this evidence, 
how can coordination mechanisms ensure effectiveness? Often, subsidiaries are far from headquarters and 
autonomous: when an unexpected event occurs, how can coordination mechanisms ensure reliability? Organizational 
literature describes a number of coordination mechanisms, all aimed at ensuring that in an organization the right 
actions are carried out at the right time and place and by the right people (Roberts, 2004). This issue is so relevant that, 
for some authors, coordination is synonymous with organization (Hatchuel, 2002). The coordination mechanisms most 
studied are direct supervision, standardization by procedures, skills, outputs, and culture. Direct supervision will not 
be discussed here because, by choice, this article focuses on a situation in which the operator is far (hierarchically but 
above all physically) from his superior. Likewise, there will be no discussion of standardization by culture, as the 
required realization time is often too long for an organization. This article will therefore focus on standardization by 
skills, procedures (routine) and results (output), discussing them in the context of organizational reliability, namely 
contingency prevention and management.  
Standardization by skills seeks to provide an a priori definition of the range of skills that must be possessed by 
persons fulfilling given roles. This is a coordination mode typical of organizations possessing explicit, codified skills 
sets which are easily replicable and transferable (Grandori, 1992). This mechanism, while making it possible to deal 
with situations marked by complexity and high-level professionalism, is a preventive control mode whose practical 
effectiveness is limited in eccentric and unexpected situations. 
Procedural standardization implies an a priori definition of performance (March, 1993) or routine programs the 
operator must adhere to. Performance programs function well when the environment is stable and predictable, and 
they represent an “organizational memory” (Olson et al., 2005), yet they reveal insurmountable limits in conditions of 
uncertainty or in the presence of bounded rationality, since they do not provide the operator with a strategy for dealing 
with unexpected situations. Also, routines generate expectations about the environment which in turn cause a selective 
perception of information, thus limiting the knowledge of that environment (Weick, Sutcliffe, 2007). 
Standardization by output implies an a priori definition of the results to be achieved. It is a control mechanism 
based on greater autonomy of the operator, who is permitted margins of discretion even within the constraints that 
characterize the primary work system. In general, this mechanism proves effective (Merchant, Riccaboni, 2001) when 
the results to be achieved are known and accurately definable in advance, in a positive sense, or, as in the case of 
reliable organizations, in a negative sense (what it is desired to avoid at all costs). 
If standardization by output seems to be the most effective coordination mechanism in terms of preventive 
reliability, the characteristics of the operator must also be taken into account. In this sense, standardization by output 
does not deny expertise value; on the contrary, the mechanism of delegation and accountability by results is an 
antecedent of the Fifth HRO Principle: respect for expertise (Weick, Sutcliffe, 2007). In the context of process, 
responsibility for the result is assigned to those who are most skilled, regardless of rank, and where the skill in 
question is linked strictly to the expected result. 
In addition, the coordination mechanism by result is an antecedent of the Third HRO Principle: sensitivity to 
ongoing activities (Weick, Sutcliffe, 2007), since it transfers responsibility onto the agent acting in the real situation, 
in a context of subsidiarity (the problem, wherever it crops up, is dealt with in autonomy). 
Finally, standardization by output generates a high level of responsibility in an operator who is called on to act in a 
situation of uncertainty whose outcome does not depend solely on his actions. To prevent this uncertainty from being 
demotivating, the operator must possess or acquire certain characteristics. 
2.1. Operator characteristics for contingency management  
Standardization by output is considered a powerful means for aligning the operator’s objectives with the 
organization’s, but organizations must consider the operator’s characteristics in order not to delegate a task to the 
wrong person, thus endangering the survival of the person himself or even the entire organization. The psychological 
literature describes at least four operator characteristics associated with the management of high-uncertainty situations: 
the level of self-efficacy (Bandura, Wood, 1989); the internal locus of control (Rotter, 1966); bricolage skill and the 
attitude of wisdom (Weick, 1993). 
Self-efficacy indicates the extent to which a person feels capable of achieving a desired result. Bandura (1969a, 
1969b, 1971) emphasizes and describes the influence on behavior of one’s own expectations and those of others, 
expectations that influence outcomes which in turn, circularly, influence subsequent expectations and outcomes. In 
other words, the attainment of an outcome influences the perception of one’s own abilities, as well as the expectations 
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regarding the solution of similar problems in the future, and therefore the Agent’s behavior. Those with high levels of 
self-efficacy persevere in their goal-achieving attempts, attribute failure to lack of commitment and not to adverse 
situations, are able to cope with environmental stress, have ambitious career objectives, and attain personal success 
easily. In practical terms, the expectation of self-efficacy seems to be the best predictor of performance (Cooper, 
Robinson, 1991; Fuad, 1994). For the purposes of organizational reliability, it is important that self-efficacy not turn 
into overconfidence. 
The concept of locus of control “expresses the way in which events that occur in accordance with an 
internal/external polarity are interpreted. It also implies the subject’s perception of the possibility of controlling 
events.” (Di Fabio, 2003, 202). This perception is also referable differentially to positive and negative events. The 
locus of control is located along a continuum between two polarities, an internal one and an external one. The internal 
locus is typical of individuals who believe in their own ability to control events. They attribute their successes or 
failures to factors directly related to the exercise of their skills, determination and aptitudes. In contrast, the external 
locus characterizes those who consider life events, such as rewards or punishments, to be, not the result of the direct 
exercise of personal skills, but rather the result of unforeseeable external factors such as chance, luck or destiny. In the 
context of reliability, we can infer that the internal locus of control is correlated to greater proactivity on the part of the 
subject. 
Bricolage skill (Weick, 1993) is what enables an individual to find solutions by using the elements at hand, namely 
the ability to see a solution which others fail to see. It is not an innate skill, but one based largely on the operator’s 
experience. If the operator has acquired a working knowledge of hundreds and hundreds of solutions, based on 
answers to as many different situations, his bricolage skill will consist of recalling the solution best suited to the 
problem he faces. ‘Bricoleurs remain creative under pressure, precisely because they routinely act in chaotic 
conditions and pull order out of them. Thus, when situations unravel, this is simply normal natural trouble for 
bricoleurs, and they proceed with whatever materials are at hand’ (Weick, 1993, 639). Knowing these materials 
intimately, they then are able, usually in the company of other similarly skilled people, to form the materials or 
insights into novel combinations. Likewise, Lanzara (1993) called negative capability the ability of an operator to 
generate alternative frames for cognition in a specific situation. An organizational situation ‘produces  the agent’s 
behaviour which, in turn, produces the organizational situation’ (Lanzara, 1993, 11). Negative capability is not 
oriented to apply to well-known routines,  but to dispute the mechanisms that underlie a routine, and to assess the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the routine itself.  
The attitude of wisdom (Weick, 1993) should not be confused with wisdom itself (which is a knowledge derived 
from study): wisdom is knowing without excessive certainty and without excessive caution. Understanding the role of 
wisdom (Bigelow, 1992) as a source of resilience is a Socratic kind of knowledge (the operator knows he doesn’t 
know), a kind of knowledge which is free of presumption on the one hand and of excessive caution on the other. The 
cocksure type is short on curiosity, while the milksop type is paralysed; in either case, an imbalanced attitude towards 
the situation is to be expected. Psychologists have attempted to define wisdom variously as a composite of personal 
qualities or abilities (Ardelt, 2005), as the final state of psychosocial development (Herickson, 1982), as a high level of 
cognitive reasoning (Kramer, 2000), or even as a way to live ‘a good life’ (Yang, 2013). As an attitude, wisdom 
resides in individuals, and it has been conceptualized in at least two distinct (but not mutually exclusive) domains: a 
cognitive domain and a constellation of personal attributes. The Max-Planck model (Baltes, Smith, 1990; Dittmann-
Kohli, Baltes, 1990; for a review, Kramer, 2000) posits five specific criteria of wisdom: 1) rich factual knowledge 
about the matters of life; 2) procedural knowledge about ways of dealing with life problems; 3) life-span 
contextualism and, more relevant to the aims of this paper 4) uncertainty in problem definition and finally 5) 
relativism regarding problem solution. 
It is important to note that this last element, wisdom, serves as a moderator of both self-efficacy and the internal 
locus of control, by preventing them from turning into overconfidence, which would lead to an underestimation of the 
situation’s danger. 
2.2. Training models which form the basis of reliability  
As described in the literature (Betz, 1992), an adequate level of self-efficacy and internal locus of control can be 
developed through training carried out in various ways. One of these is gaining a mastery of experience, by which goal 
achievement creates in the worker a sense of potentiality and therefore of effectiveness. Vicarious experiences are also 
important: watching others like oneself achieve a goal bolsters belief in one’s own capacities. Another factor that 
bolsters a sense of self-efficacy is social persuasion: if third parties convince the worker of his abilities he will 
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probably be encouraged to try harder to achieve his goal. This approach is consistent with the goal setting theory 
(Locke, Latham, 1990). 
Among the moderators of the relationship between standardization by output and performance, the literature points 
to feedback (FB). Providing regular feedback on the agent’s progress in a given activity is a key success factor of his 
performance. Also, FB is the basis for any chance of seeing one’s value recognized, and thereby of increasing one’s 
self-esteem, sense of self-efficacy, and internal locus of control. FB is itself essentially a learning process which can 
be considered “information about our progress towards goals we want to achieve” (Schein, 2001, 141). 
The culture of error is a sine qua non for developing an attitude of wisdom. It has by now been proven (Weick, 
Sutcliffe, 2007) that organizational, managerial and training models that exploit rather than penalize error and failure 
incidents are correlations of reliability, and in particular of the First HRO Principle: concern about critical events. 
Wisdom is built by making mistakes and allowing mistakes to happen, as long as the situation does not affect the 
survival of the system: it must, of course, occur in a protected environment. The curve of the function that binds 
experience and wisdom has the form of an inverted “U”: at first it increases with experience, to the point where 
wisdom begins to diminish from overconfidence. Meacham (1983) argued that wisdom is an attitude rather than a skill 
or a body of information, and therefore it develops through a process of trial and error. Errors lead people to an 
enhanced awareness of the uncertainty of problem definition that reflects the ambiguity and multiple interpretations of 
organizational problems; finally, the attitude of wisdom is improved by exploitation of multiple solutions, even in 
opposition to each other: relativism in problem solving involves the recognition of the inherent unpredictability of 
outcomes (Baltes, Smith, 1990; Dittmann-Kohli, Baltes, 1990). Findings in literature (Lyster, 1996) suggest that sages 
underestimate their wisdom, and this is the ‘Socratic core-competence’ that makes possible attitudes of wisdom; 
Lyster also found older people to be among the top scorers on wisdom criteria, leading her to assert that wisdom 
shows a different life-span evolution than other cognitive processes.  
Bricolage skill develops by imposing on others or oneself the solution to a problem with what one has at hand, 
without resorting to pre-defined solutions or appealing to more experienced persons. This is not a generative action, 
because nothing is created from nothing: to solve a problem, the ‘bricoleur’ exploits resources already available in the 
situation (information, tools, materials).  
Improvement of bricolage skills demands full delegation to the operator, who is responsible for output, in 
accordance with the statements of an output-based agency relationship. Furthermore, the operator is often acting far 
(hierarchically and physically) from the managerial level, alone or as part of a team, and so has ample autonomy in 
decision-making. Accordingly with the goal setting theory, standardization by output as a coordination mechanism has 
more efficacy if the desired goal is challenging and, conversely, a challenging goal is a powerful mechanism to elicit 
motivation and to force the operator to enhance bricolage skills.  
Finally, Lanzara (1993) suggests that only a breakdown event shows the origin and the limits of organizational 
routine; also, an unexpected event often shows the unconscious routines which underlie organizational behaviour. So, 
as a training method, the creation of problematic and unexpected situations is the best way to improve bricolage skill.  
 
2.3. Multiple agents and organizational reliability: further research perspectives 
The literature on HRO emphasizes the role of relational networks and mutual support for the sake of resilience 
(Weick, 1993, Weick, Sutcliffe. 2007). Unlike the vertical control system represented by the principal-agent dyad, 
mutual monitoring concerns the reciprocal assessment of performance among individuals working on common tasks, 
whose contributions are evaluated and rewarded by a firm on the basis of a collective outcome. Mutual monitoring, 
which de-emphasizes dependence on superiors and instead places control in the hands of peers, is buttressed by the 
common bond of agents whose interests are intertwined (Welbourne, Balkin, Gomez-Mejia, 1995).  
On the other hand, Jensen and Meckling noted that "[the firm] serves as a focus for a complex process in which the 
conflicting objectives of individuals are harnessed into common goals. . . . Agency costs arise in any situation 
involving cooperative effort by two or more people even though there is no clear-cut principal-agent relationship" 
(1976, 307).  
The psychosocial literature indicates critical points on these issues, critical points that under certain conditions lead 
to weaknesses in (multi-agent) teamwork. First of all, a situation characterized by ambiguity may increase the chances 
that the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance (Latane, Darley, 1970) and social proof (Cialdini, 1984) may occur, to 
produce paralysis of action. 
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Moreover, in a situation that is unequivocal but characterized by joint and several liability, there may be an 
increased occurrence of diffusion of responsibility (Wallach et al, 1964), which also paralyzes action and in addition 
can generate opportunistic behavior in one or more team members. 
 
3. Conclusion 
Distance is potentially damaging to effectiveness and reliability, as “the decay and loss of distance is precisely the 
decay and loss of knowledge, relationships, and trust, which in turn undermines the ability to act at and over distance” 
(Goodall and Roberts, 2003, p. 1155). Following this argument, mechanisms of coordination and control that rely on 
personal interactions between individuals are likely to be harmed by distance (Ambos, Ambos, 2009, 4). Accordingly,  
the empirical evidence in organizational literature (in particular, Agency Theory) would suggest recourse to output-
based coordination mechanisms. On the other hand, the empirical evidence in psychological literature would suggest, 
wherever possible, recourse to a system of individual responsibilities clearly defined in terms of the expected result 
(Welbourne, Balkin, Gomez-Mejia, 1995). Future research on the subject of HRO will need to clarify the criteria of 
choice between individual and collective responsibility in emergency management. 
Finally, the review of the existing literature (Lu, 2003, 207) has also noted a shift from the dominance of economic 
theories (transaction cost theory, I/O theory, etc.) to multidisciplinary approaches. Therefore, opportunities exist to 
study ISM topics through different theoretical approaches, such as psychological and organizational ones. 
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